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How this study was prepared 
 
In 1997, Professors Stephen R. Bowers and Marion T. Doss, Jr., began an 
effort to promote the systematic study of the problems of political violence. 
The result of their initiative was the creation in 1998 of the William R. 
Nelson Institute for Public Affairs, a research and service institute that 
functioned on the campus until 2005 when it was transformed into the 
Center for Security and Science.  
 
As part of an effort to advance studies of the former Soviet Union, 
Bowers and Doss established a Moldova branch of their organization in 
February, 2000. The operating philosophy governing the opening of the 
Moldova office was that such a base would enable us to involve local 
scholars in our research, thus producing internationally based studies that 
would reflect both the U.S. and the non-U.S. perspectives. The first action of 
Valeria Ciobanu, the Director of the Moldova office, was to contact 
individuals who were involved the FSU's historic transition in a scholarly 
capacity. Our early efforts enabled us to develop working relationships with 
academics and professionals in Moldova, Moscow, Kazakhstan, and the 
Caucasus region. 
 
Development of this study of the Chechen Sufi brotherhoods 
demonstrates our ability to consult a wide range of scholars whose primary 
insights represent a unique combination of perspectives. The primary 
authors are specialists based in Russia, Moldova and the United States 
(James Madison University. Their work is complemented by other 
individuals residing in the former USSR. 
 
Work on this document began in March when Valeria Ciobanu 
traveled to Moscow and Kazakhstan in order to meet with people directly 
involved in studies of religious brotherhoods in Chechnya. The next month, 
at the invitation of the Caucasus Forum, Ms. Ciobanu participated in a 
conference in Kislovodsk, Russia, that brought together representatives of 
53 organizations interested in a variety of north Caucasus issues.   
 
Most notable among those individuals who provided assistance to us 
in the preparation of this study were Aslambek Aslahanov, President of the 
Chechen Association, Laila Timurkayeva, of the Russian Legal Workers 
Associat ion, petroleum engineer Albert Avduev, and several members of the 
Chechen diaspora in the former USSR. The analysis that follows Professor 
Akhmadov's paper is, to a great extent, a result of their collective 
contributions.   
 
Valeria Ciobanu at the 
Caucasus Forum 
Valeria Ciobanu meeting 
with Chechen refugees 
Aslambek Aslahanov 
Laila Timurkayeva  
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The Chechens 
 
In the introduction to her study “Who Are the Chechen?”, Johanna Nichols 
explains that the term “Chechen” is a Russian ethnonym, based on the name 
of a village, Chechen-aul, rather than the name used by these people to 
describe themselves. Rather than “Chechen”, they call themselves either as 
“Nokhchi” or, more frequently in recent years, as “Vainah,” a term best 
translated as “my nation, my people.” Like their neighbors, the Ingush were 
also given their name by the Russians. They were named after the village of 
Angusht. The Ingush refer to themselves as the Ghalghay, They took this 
name from an association of three major families which shared the common 
surname Ghalghay. The Chechens are the largest North Caucasian group 
and the second largest Caucasian group after the Georgians. Although most 
Chechens are literate in Russian, at least 97% of them claim Chechen as 
their first language. i 
 
The Chechen people have occupied their north Caucasian homeland 
for several millennia prior to the Russian arrival. Their society was 
characterized by no social or class distinctions and the only meaningful 
categories of rank were based on age, kinship and social honor. And 
although they had no formal governmental structures, they saw themselves 
an independent nation with their own language and territory. 
 
Since the Russian entry into the region, the Chechens have suffered 
deportations, the suppression of linguistic and religious structures, and the 
attempt to destroy their culture through programs of Sovietization. The 
Russian-Chechen relationship has been characterized by partnership,  
periodic explosions of nationalism, violent military clashes, brutal 
suppression, and economic desolation.  
 
 
i Johanna Nichols, “Who Are 
the Chechen?”, Linguist List, 
http://www.hartford -
hwp.com/archives/63/077.htm , 
pp. 1-2. Nichols, pp. 3-5. 
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Major Russian-Chechen Wars  
 
For over six millennia, Chechens have lived in and defended their North 
Caucasian homeland against the inroads of successive invaders, including 
Persians, Arabs, Mongols, Buddhists, Turks and Russians. Converted to 
Islam at about the same time as the Russian conquest (from the late 1500s to 
mid-1800s), the Chechens have waged successive wars against the Russian 
Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Russian Republic, first to avoid conquest 
and then to achieve independence. The following table illustrates the 
relentless nature of this ongoing, intermittent warfare. 
 
Synopsis of the Russian-Chechen conflicts 
 
Period Chechen Leader(s)  Sufi Order 
Involved 
Result 
Late 1700s Sheik Mansur Ushurma Naqshbandi  Russians defeated in 1785 
battle of Sunzha River 
1824-1859 Series of Imams, best 
known is Sheik Imam 
Shamil 
Naqshbandi  Short-lived Islamic state 
1864-1865, 
1877, 1879, 
1890s 
Various followers of 
the Chechen Ghandi, 
Qadiri Sheik Kunta 
Hadji Kishiev 
Qadiri along 
with 
Naqshbandi  
Contested Russian rule 
through WWI 
1917-1925 Sheik Uzun Hadji, et al  
Sheik Ali Mitaev 
Naqshbandi  
Qadiri 
Uprising suppressed in 
1925 
1929-1936   Soviet purge of Sufi adepts 
continues until eve of 
WWII 
1940, 1943 Hassan Izrailov  Entire nation deported to 
Siberia in 194, returned to 
Chechnya in 1957. New 
Sufi brotherhood Vis Hadji 
or Vakhab formed during 
exile 
1990 President Jhokhar 
Dudaev 
Quasi-
Qadirist  
Struggle for independence  
1992-1994, mobilization 
1994-1996 President Jhokhar 
Dudaev 
Quasi-
Qadirist  
War with Russia and de 
facto independence  
1999-2000 President Aslan 
Maskhadov 
Shamil Basaev 
? 
 
Vakhab 
Current war begun by 
Vakhab Islamic 
conservatives also known 
as Chechen Fighters 
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What Is Sufism and Why Is It Important? 
 
 
In their book Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union, 
Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush argue that Sufism is an 
important aspect of Islam throughout the world and is becoming 
increasingly important in what was the USSR when they wrote their book. 
In that study, they provide an introduction to Sufism, analyze the structure 
of Sufi brotherhoods, describe the recruitment of adepts, and examine the 
make-up of the brotherhoods and the inner life of those associations ii. 
More recent studies have indicated that the revival of interest in 
Chechen culture has been accompanied by a conversion to the Sunni branch 
of Islam. Most adhere to the Sufi form of Islam and join together in 
brotherhoods of 10 to 40 disciples (or disciples). They believe that 
practitioners of the faith can achieve a mystical union with God through the 
zikr, a ceremony that consists of a recitation of prayers that may be 
accompanied by vigorous dancing that will induce an ecstatic state. Islam 
did not replace traditional Chechen culture but became a part of it, thus 
preserving the identity of the Chechen nation iii. 
Sufism is significant because it is a popular rallying point and, to the 
external world, it is not obvious who is or is not a member of these 
clandestine brotherhoods. Sufism gives its adherents an organizational basis 
that is somewhat like that of the early communist party during its 
revolutionary stage of development. Sufism is the predominant form of 
Islam in Chechnya.  
During the Soviet era, authorities worked to control the formal 
religious structures seen as necessary for the practice and persistence of 
Islam. Consequently, there was an “official Islam,” supported by the state 
but maintained at a clearly inadequate level of support. While Soviet 
officials believed that this condition would lead to a deterioration of Islamic 
religious life, the real impact was the nurturing of a system of “parallel 
Islam” totally beyond the reach of state control. This parallel system 
supported the de facto expansion of Islam during a time of anti-Islamic 
policy iv. 
Chechen Zikr 
iii  Edward Kline, “Chechnya 
After the War”, ASF New 
Documents , 
http://www.wdn.com/asf/cgi/
ASF, October, 1998, 
accessed on May 1, 2000. 
iv Bennigsen and Wimbush, 
pp. 85-86. 
ii Alexandre Benningsen and 
S. Enders Wimbush, Mystics 
and Commissars: Sufism in 
the Soviet Union. Berkeley: U 
of California P, 1985, pp. 1-2.
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Kunta Hadji 
 
There are twenty-seven religious movements operating in Chechnya today. 
Kunta Hadji is one of the most important of these and is associated with the 
Qadiriya brotherhood, generally regarded as the second most important of 
the Soviet-era brotherhoods. As Professor Y. Z. Akhmadov explains, the 
Kunta Hadji movement is the most significant form of Sufism in Chechnya.  
Soviet and Czarist efforts to suppress this movement were intense. 
One consequence of the suppression of the Kunta Hadji movement is that no 
official portraits of Kunta Hadji exist. Professor Akhmadov recounts a 
meeting that he had in Elishan-Jurt, the village in which Kunta Hadji was 
born. The local murid said that during his prayers, he had a vision of Kunta 
Hadji. Later, someone showed him a picture and, based on the vision from 
his prayers, he declared that it was the founder of this movement. Efforts to 
find an artistic conception of what Kunta Hadji looked like have been very 
difficult. It is apparent that no such photograph or portrait can be found 
anywhere in Chechnya or the surrounding region. Based on what initially 
appeared to be a promising lead, our contacts conducted a search in 
Uzbekistan but, to date, have failed to locate the Sufi saint’s picture. 
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KUNTA-HADJI AND THE KUNTA-HADJISTS 
The Kunta-Hadji Chechen Religious Movement  
Y.Z. AKHMADOV 
Chechen Academy of Sciences  
 
 
In Chechnya's long history of national-liberation movements and 
wars, an important role was played by events connected with the name of 
the Sheik Kunta-Hadji. His name and the movement linked to it acquired 
special relevance in the 1990's, when a new attempt to politicize this 
religious brotherhood took place. For many people, Kunta-Hadji became the 
"Chechen Gandhi."  
No fearsome Chechen warrior such as Mansur, Ghazi-Mohammed, 
Shamil, or even the legendary brave men Baibullat Taimiev, Bdysangur 
Benoyevski, et cetera has been able to exercise such powerful influence on 
the spiritual life of the Chechen people as this modest peasant-worker, 
"miska" (man of God not of this world). The name of the Sheik is so holy 
that people considered it a "taboo." In Chechnya, people call him "The 
Sheik from Eliskhan-Yurt", "Son of Kisha", or simply "Hadji". He is 
considered to have reached a "hidden state of existence" and the details 
surrounding his death are not believed.  
Throughout its existence, the atheist Soviet regime conducted a 
fierce ideological war against the "Son of Kisha" and his followers. Despite 
great effort, the Soviets lost this war; the name of the Sheik is still being 
worshipped by the people of Chechnya, and the number of his followers has 
grown up to this day. Currently, the number of active murids1 (adepts) in the 
Islamic brotherhood (Order) of the "Sheik from Eliskhan-Yurt", who 
actively practice the dictates of the Order amounts to some 20 to 25 
thousand in Chechnya. However, the total number of those who accept the 
Order (i.e. recognize the Sheik as their ustaz2, although without performing 
active duties) numbers several hundred thousand followers.  
Consequently, the Order of the Son of Kisha is the largest, most 
influential, and, most importantly, the most dynamic, fastest growing 
organization in the contemporary Chechen Republic. This allows us to 
conclude that the phenomenon of the famous mid-19th century Chechen 
Sheik has not yet been exhausted.  
The “Hadji movement,” in both its political and religious contexts, 
essentially has not been studied. While writing this article, I used facts 
published by representatives of the Czarist administration—A. Ippolitov and 
1 Muridism – the most 
militant movement in 
Islam. Murids were 
obliged to follow blindly 
the orders of sheikhs and 
imams. The extreme 
expression of muridism is 
the idea of “gazavat” – 
the war against “non-
believers.”  
2 “Ustaz” – religious 
teacher 
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G. A. Vertepov, and carefully reviewed works of authors of the Soviet and 
post-Soviet periods, such as H. D. Oshayev, A. A. Salamov, A. D. 
Yandarov, V. H. Akayev, and M. M. Moustafinov. It is important to note the 
role of the latter author, whose doctoral dissertation on the Order of Kunta-
Hadji and its followers has been particularly helpful. The monographic work 
on Kunta-Hadji has been compiled by V.H. Akayev.  
From sources related to the above-mentioned movement, we could 
name documents found in various archives in Caucasian cities, particularly 
Grozny, Vladikavkaz, Tbilisi, Makhachkala, as well as publications of 
preachings of the "Son of Kisha" undertaken before the Soviet revolution in 
the Daghestani town of Temirkhak-Shura. I have personally gathered a 
small field material—local stories, legends, including video and audio 
recordings.  
There are also materials on the topic by several American and 
British researchers—G. C. Lemercier-Quelquege, A. Benningsen, G. E. von 
Grunebaum, and G. C. Trimmingham, all of whom have written on various 
Sufi movements in the Caucasus and the USSR. 
It is necessary to caveat this research with the following important 
explanation. The author finds it impossible to characterize here the entire 
complicated world of Sufi teachings, the intricacies of various currents and 
theological interpretations, or to explain the phenomenon of "Sheikdoms" in 
Chechnya. For that purpose, a different author should be sought, and most 
likely such material would be geared towards a different audience. I would 
dare to generalize by saying that nearly all contemporary researchers are 
educated in the spirit of rationalistic knowledge; the religious cognition has 
its own world, its own values, its own universe. In order to understand it, 
one needs to accept the dogma of miracles, admit that the laws of nature are 
subject to change. We limit our goals to describing the course of events 
from the outside perspective of this movement, and not from the inside.  
Therefore, according to our data, Kunta was born by the end of the 
first third of the 19th century3, in the family of a Chechen named Kisha from 
the village Melchi-Khi (Istee-Sou). Kisha's family belonged to the clan of 
Gukhoy, one of the 120 Chechen clans. This comparably small family drew 
its roots from the Andic society of Daghestan, as well as from the eastern 
part of Chechnya and Ichkeria. According to data from informative sources, 
when the then future Sheik turned 7, his parents moved to a relatively small 
village of Eliskhan-Yurt on the river Michik, which subsequently gave name 
to the entire Chechen society (Michigonic). 
The story goes that even prior to the birth of the future saint, various 
unusual phenomena took place, which were keenly observed by his mother 
Khedi. And indeed, since early childhood the boy attracted attention due to 
3 By the time he was captured in 
1864, Kunta-Hadji was 35-40 
years old. 
 14
his extraordinary natural wisdom, his ability to read people's minds, and his 
ability to see into the future. At the same time, he was unable to receive a 
rigorous religious education, although there are sources indicating that he 
could recite the entire Koran by age 12. Establishing a family, the future 
Sheik was primarily engaged in agricultural work and raising bees. His wife 
was, according to certain sources, the daughter of a famous Chechen 
warlord—Baibullat Taimiev ("the terror of Caucasus" in the words of the 
renowned Russian poet A.S.Pushkin, who apparently was acquainted with 
him), who reportedly died in the early 1830's. This fact suggests the 
importance of the "Son of Kisha" in the society, despite his poverty. His 
physical disability, along with his keen mind, deep religious zeal, and 
exceptional gift of prophecy drew him to the teachings of Sufism, which had 
already been circulating throughout the North Caucasus for some centuries. 
It is known he first learned of Sufism sometime during the fourth decade of 
the 19th century from a famous Nahib and Sheik Tashu-Hadji of the 
Naqshband religious current. Tashu-Hadji, just like Shamil4 himself, had 
been an apprentice of Mohammed Yara, a popular preacher of the so-called 
"Caucasian Muridism," which demanded of its followers to approach God 
not only in prayer, but also on the battlefield as warriors against the "non-
faithful". It is quite probable that Kunta had met other Naqshband Sheiks 
from Chechnya, such as Umalat-Hadji and Ghezn-Hadji, especially in the 
period of the Caucasus war5.  
In the meantime, the Caucasus war, which had begun yet in 1817, 
was close to an end. The Imamate of Shamil6 was showing signs of 
weakness, after 25 years of resistance against Russia, a great world power at 
the time7. This weakness had to do not only with external circumstances. 
The problem also stemmed from the fact that the Imamate government itself 
had become a burden for the mountaineers, who were unaccustomed with 
the discipline of law; permanent military incursions, high taxes, and ever 
increasing duties had exhausted the population. Despair and opposition were 
starting to gain momentum in the Imamate.  
Under these extreme circumstances, the "Son of Kisha," 
approaching the age of 30, spoke out against the policies conducted by 
Shamil, calling on his followers to refrain from getting involved in worldly 
issues and focus solely on prayer while seeking the mercy of God. He also 
predicted the fall of the Imamate and the imprisonment of the Imam himself. 
His statements, backed by the young preacher’s increasing authority, were 
warmly received by this mountainous nation racked with fatigue and 
hopelessness.  
Imam Shamil, a person of great patience and scrupulous fairness, 
responded by inviting the ascetic to his capital Vedeno several times, where 
6 Imamate – theocratic in its 
ideology and feudal in its 
political and social structure, 
this state existed in the North-
Eastern Caucasus. Shamil 
created an Imamate in the 
territory of Chechnya and 
Daghestan in the 1840s for 
struggle against Russia. 
Disintegrated in 1859. 
 
7 More detailed – in the journal 
“Vainakh segodnya”, N-2(4) 
1997 
Imam Shamil 
4 Imam Shamil (1797-
1871)-religious and 
secular leader of 
imamate; considered to 
be a legendary hero of 
the Chechens and some 
other ethnic groups in the 
Caucasus 
5 The Caucasus War 
(1817-1864) resulted 
in the conquest of 
Caucasus by Russia 
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he was given the opportunity to dispute his convictions with the Imam's 
theologians 8. Legends say the "Son of Kisha" easily baffled his opponents 
with the depth of his queries. Finally, by early 1859, at Shamil's suggestion, 
the refractory Chechen departed on his pilgrimage to Mecca (hadji)9. On 
August 26, 1859, surrounded by the Russian army on the Gunib-Dag 
Mountain, Shamil capitulated and was sent as war prisoner to Russia10.  
One of the fundamental characteristics of the "Hadji" fraternity, 
which sets it apart from the other Sufi brotherhoods of the Northern 
Caucasus, is the so-called "quick" or "loud" zikr11 and a peculiar ritualistic 
dance. This raises the question as to when and where did "Hadji" become 
acquainted with such details of the Qadirian current of Sufism, namely the 
"loud" zikr (scream of prayer, or typical Islamic call to prayer by a loud crier 
(muezzin) located atop the minaret - the tower of the Mosque). Was it prior 
to his pilgrimage to Mecca, or during the travels? Not even the murids can 
agree on this issue.  
One way or the other, during his three-year journey throughout the 
Ottoman Empire, the "Son of Kisha" had the opportunity to encounter 
various Sufi currents and interpretations, but it is clear that he had chosen to 
concentrate of the Qadirian one12. It is true that the pre-Revolutionary author 
G.A. Vertepov believed the father of the Chechen eikhrism was a follower 
of the Roufai'a movement (named after its founder Sayed Ahmed Roufai'a), 
which used fire in its worship, inflicting wounds using cold weapons, and so 
forth. However, the practice of eikhrism in Chechnya does not confirm the 
presence of such extremes.  
The “Son of Kisha” had been in the Ottoman Empire between the 
years 1859 and 1861, yet his correspondence was arriving in Chechnya even 
before 1861. In his epistles, he preached prayer "zikr-ullah," love for one’s 
neighbor, the need for earning one's bread with one's own work, helping the 
poor and the orphans, the importance of abstaining from alcohol and 
tobacco, forgiving one’s enemies, including those who had committed 
mortal offenses, and so forth. 
Upon his return from Mecca in 1861, his rating and popularity rose 
considerably among the Chechen people. He was now a "Hadji", a preacher, 
a prophet, whose prophecies concerning the fate of the Imamate and Shamil 
had fully come true. At that time, numerous adepts soon surrounded him, 
forming a religious community with a rather strong internal organization. 
Soon thereafter, the "Son of Kisha" became a "Sheik", which in Chechen 
terms implies holiness. He was recognized as a man, to whom the future and 
the mysteries of the Universe had been revealed, and as a symbol of that, he 
observed the "khalvat"—a voluntary time of fasting and prayer which could 
last for many days—which he spent in a deep underground cave (still 
8 Shamil didn’t support 
Kunta-Khadji because he 
wanted to preserve 
muridism; he disliked the 
popularity of Kunta’s 
followers and their calls for 
asceticism and equality. 
9 This opinion is not 
supported by documents.  
11 This custom was 
prohibited in imamate. 
12 Abd al-Qadir al-Gilani 
(1077-1166), who lived in 
Iraq, is the founder of this 
school of thought. In the 
middle of the 12th century 
he was well known in 
Baghdad and the Islamic 
world. 
10 More detailed in the 
journal "Vainakh 
segodnya," no. 2(4), 
1997
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preserved by his worshipers in the village of Eliskhan-Yurt).  
The brotherhood was headed by the "holy teacher" himself, who 
was also known as "the leading Imam". Two most trustworthy disciples, 
Salman and Machik, were given the right to conduct religious services, the 
so-called preaching of the Qadiri tarikat; they were also named as Sheiks. 
For the ongoing administration of the fraternal Order, nahibs, vekhils, 
turkhs, and tamads (supervisors) were named from among the most 
prominent disciples.  
The "Son of Kisha" and his representatives were demanding that 
ordinary murids follow the holy rituals of the zikr, strictly abide by the 
Shari'a (Islamic Law), dedicate themselves to serving God alone, and not 
participate in worldly affairs. The movement quickly spread throughout the 
entire Chechen territory and even into neighboring Ingushetia, the sound of 
zikr was heard in every corner of the country. At the same time, along with 
the rise in religious conscience based on the Order of "Hadji," a strong anti-
governmental conspiracy against Imperial Russia emerged in Chechnya.  
In order to gain a deep understanding of the causes that fueled this 
conspiracy, we need quickly to characterize the situation created after 
Russia defeated the Imamate in Chechnya.  
The country had been completely ravaged by the long-lasting war; 
the population in Chechnya at the beginning of this historical period was 
close to 200,000 inhabitants, and after only 25 years, in the 1860's, it 
numbered about 130,000. Losses from direct military actions, famine, and 
epidemics amounted to at least 150-200 thousand victims. The massive and 
complicated irrigation system of the Chechen plateau had been destroyed. 
The strong opponent had captured all forests and half of the arable land.   
The unbearable economic, physical and moral climate of constant 
pressure experienced by the Chechen nation demanded resolution. The 
military catastrophe and fall of the Imamate represented only a short pause 
in the ongoing saga of the warrior nation. Already, by May 1860, in Eastern 
Chechnya (Ikcheria) and in the heights of Argun, a new armed peasant 
revolt had burst out under the leadership of former nahibs, supporters of 
Shamil. By late January 1860, Czarist generals destroyed 15 auls (villages) 
in Ikcheria to suppress the rebellion in Eastern Chechnya13. Nahib Bysangur 
Benoyevski had been captured, and hanged upon conviction by a military-
field trial.  
During the summer of 1861, the entire Argun okrug (region) had 
been captured by the rebels under the leadership of Ouma Douev and Ata'i 
Ataev. By the fall of 1861, 15 infantry battalions, 700 Cossacks, 1,900 units 
of cavalry, 3 artillery divisions had conducted a revenge mission in the 
mountains of Chechnya. In December 1861, the Argun insurrection had 
13 General Ermolov, 
supreme commander in 
the Caucasus region in 
1817-1827, developed a 
plan for the conquest of 
Caucasus, which was to 
be implemented first in 
Chechnya; it included the 
construction of fortresses, 
destruction of rebel 
villages and elimination of 
their inhabitants. After 
Ermolov was recalled in 
1827, the policy of 
“elimination” continued. 
More detailed – in the 
journal “Vainakh 
segodnya”, N1-3(7-9), 
1998: Avtorkhanov A. 
“Caucasus, the War of 
Caucasus, and Shamil.” 
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been crushed, and the leaders captured and exiled to Russia. 
Having been defeated in open insurrections, the patriotic forces of 
Chechnya decided to take advantage of the growing religious movement of 
the Son of Kisha, and carry out an nationalist uprising with the aim of 
overthrowing the foreign, authoritarian regime of the conquering power, 
imperial Russia.  
It is important to mention that we are operating here with the notion 
of the "Kunta-Hadji movement" with a certain degree of understanding. The 
Sheik personally denied being a titular "spiritual leader" or Imam and, 
moreover, had ceased his personal activity as a preacher, communicating 
with his people through mediators. He used to characterize himself as "the 
Messiah sent unto the world by the Imam (Makhdi)" to prepare the believers 
for his return. In the meantime, the movement had been gradually acquiring 
a more political focus and had attracted numerous supporters from among 
veterans of the late Imam Shamil,, in essence all who were unhappy about 
the current polity. By 1863 an especially secret leadership had developed to 
challenge the czarist administration. There were lesser leaders, nahibs, 
higher murids, essentially an entire hierarchy of power had been established.  
Imperial forces, which by that time had already acquired significant 
experience fighting the liberation movements of Caucasian nations, were 
able to introduce their agents and informants within the zikrist movement. 
Having known of the upcoming conspiracy, the Czarist ranks were opposing 
the more orthodox mullahs and Chechen clergy, giving bribes to influential 
persons in Chechen villages, and there was even a split among the masses 
based on theological divergences.  
On the other hand, the Czarist authorities stationed their troops in 
the key locations of the Chechen plain and mountains, and strengthened 
their garrisons. Without warning, on January 3, 1864, in the Shalin portion 
of the Argun region, the Russians captured the "Son of Kisha" and his 
brother Movsar. In no time, a special convoy transported the captives across 
the mountain first to Vladikavkaz, and then to the city of Novocherkassk. 
Suspecting that their "spiritual leader" was under arrest in the fortress of 
Shali, several thousands of fanatically oriented murids gathered there. They 
were led by Salam and Machik, the closest supporters of the Saint from 
Eliskhan-Yurt. Holding a black flag, the famous Chechen cavalier Vara was 
also in attendance.   
By the second half of the month of January, the murids gathered 
there had already sent three delegations to the prince Tumanov, commander 
of the Czarist regiment in the Shalin fortress, demanding the release of the 
"Son of Kisha," and were thrice denied. Then a frantic ZIKR started; 
believing in Allah's intervention and the divine powers of their missing 
 18
spiritual leader, the immense crowd of about 3,000, including women, 
dropped their guns and pistols, approaching the soldiers with revenge and 
determination. The Russians responded with fire, and murids were forced to 
pick up their daggers and swords, and engage in a furious attack against the 
Czarist soldiers.  
Under heavy artillery fire, the murids could not resist, and were 
crushed quickly, over 200 were killed, and several times more were 
wounded. This battle of January 18, 1864 remained in the memory of the 
Chechen people as "Sha'altan T'om" - "the dagger fight of Shali"14.  
After this bloody battle, 18 of the key leaders of the murids were 
captured as prisoners, and sent to hard labor camps with sentences from 5 to 
8 years. Tens of active murids were exiled. Zikr and other ritual customs 
were outlawed under the penalty of exile, in the mosques in all villages anti-
zikrist preaching was read.  
However, the person mostly responsible for these events, who 
became a victim of the nationwide anti-governmental conspiracy, the person 
who has always preached abstinence from worldly affairs and who opposed 
violence as means to fight evil, preacher and ascetic, was exiled for life in 
the city of Ustyuzhko in the Novgorod gubernia (province). He passed away 
there on May 19, 1867, and there is evidence indicating the Sheik died of 
complete exhaustion caused by famine.  
In fact, zikrist believers consider that the Sheik never died, but only 
passed to a "hidden", invisible state or "condition". This clearly explains the 
Messianic mood, which still persists among the zikrist community.  
The Imperial authorities in the Caucasus were hoping that the 
massive defeat and execution of murids in the battle of Shali would end this 
new religious-political movement. But this turned out to be a self-delusion, 
the movement went underground, and the masses continued to revolt from 
time to time. Thus in May of 1865, a villager from Kharacha, Taza 
Ekmirzaev, proclaimed himself as the spiritual follower of the imprisoned 
saint, and two more villages joined him in rebellion. Gathering 200-300 
supporters and holding a green flag, Taza Ekmirzaev advanced at the head 
of his group to the mountain of Khetash-Kort (where traditionally reunions 
and national meetings were held) and proclaimed himself Imam. In turn, the 
Czarist commandant immediately deployed troops for the occupation of the 
strategic points in Northern Chechnya. Before their approach to the Taza 
camp, the local village elite, who probably regained their sense of political 
self-survival, crushed the movement.  
Taza was captured, and sentenced to execution, but later the 
sentence was replaced by 12 years of hard labor, and subsequent life exile in 
Siberia. The Kharacha village was fined, and villagers from Elistandji were 
14 More detailed – in the 
journal “Vainakh 
segodnya”, no. 1-3(7-9), 
1998: Said-Akhmed Isaev 
“Massacre in Shali.” 
 19
even forced to relocate due to their disobedience.  
For several years following the above events, a powerful and 
energetic warrior Vira operated in Chechnya. He started as a local warlord, 
but soon after the battle of Shali was named Nahib of the Order of "the Son 
of Kisha". He attempted to revive the community, and his efforts and 
military feats during the partisan war that followed earned him the image of 
a national hero. A set of popular songs and ballads about him circulate 
throughout Chechnya. However, the death of Vara in a battle against a 
Czarist detachment ended all hopes of re-establishing the political 
importance of the Order.  
Convinced that "the Chechen tribe" among all nationalities in the 
Terskaya oblast' (region) "maintained the potential spirit of a mass 
resistance," the Imperial authorities adopted a systematic, planned exile of 
the Chechen mountaineers towards the frontier of the Ottoman Empire. On 
the other hand, the mountaineers themselves began to emigrate as a sign of 
protest against the oppressive regime that deprived them of their freedom. 
During the summer of 1865, 5 thousand families, about 23 thousand people, 
left Chechnya. This was a unique massive exodus from Russia by the most 
energetic, freedom-loving segment of the Chechen population. This was 
clearly an ethnic catastrophe for the Chechens, depriving the future nation of 
its best sons. (A similar catastrophe, of even more horrible proportions, took 
place in 1944, when the Stalinist regime exiled the entire Chechen nation to 
Siberia, condemning it to extinction. An identical catastrophe is taking place 
in Chechnya today, in the eyes of the whole world.)  
Only due to their unbelievable sense of hard work and unique ability 
to survive under the harshest condition has the Chechen nation managed to 
escape disintegration and annihilation. Moreover, the traditional economy 
and customs of the Chechen people soon were restored, villages sprang back 
to life from ruins, houses, mosques, schools, a new irrigation system arose. 
Chechnya soon regained its fame as "the granary" of the Northern Caucasus.  
In the 9th decade of the 19th century, zikrism started to spread again 
in Chechnya and among Ingushets as well, but this time only as a religious 
teaching. Certain rationalistic ideas started to develop, and the system of 
organization of religious brotherhoods in the villages improved.  
However, the single gravitational center in the person of the living 
sage had already disappeared. At the same time, especially during this 
period, new Sheiks belonging to the Qadirist movement sprang up. Many 
called themselves “receivers” of the Sheik from Eliskhan-Yurta. However, 
they were applying changes in the rituals, which distinguished them from 
the classical Kunta-Hadjist movement. Overall, such Sheiks as Bamat-
Girey, Chin-Mirza, and Batal-Hadji exercised and continue to exercise a 
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regional and village-type presence, while the muridic brotherhood of the 
"Son of Kisha" embraces the entire country. Later, already in the 1950's, 
under the Soviet regime, a new Order developed of the so-called Vis-Hadji - 
"the white hats." Those consider themselves followers of Kunta-Hadji, but 
are denied categorically by his true followers.  
It is worth mentioning that by the early 20th century Daghestani 
printing houses had published volumes of the aphorisms of the late Chechen 
saint, collected by his followers.  
For someone to be a follower of the "Son of Kisha" means at this 
stage to essentially accept him as "a spiritual father" (teacher)—one's 
representative before God. This acceptance implies to carry out a certain 
number of additional prayers or formulas, such as the interpreting of the 
"zikr" in the form of a loud cry with a shrill voice (with a rhythmical 
repetition of the fundamental Islamic prayer "la-ilaha-il-Allah" while in an 
ecstatic state running around in a circle performing a peculiar "dance"). At 
the same time, the murid agrees to embrace a set of rigid moral and ethical 
rules. The Order worships as holy places the tomb of his mother Khedi in 
the village Hadji-aul in the Veden region of Chechnya, as well as the 
remains of Sheik's courtyard in the village of Eliskhan-Yurt. We have to 
mention that the Order has no unified center, each village brotherhood is led 
by an elected Turkh (leader).  
Zikrism was first popular among the poorest layers of Chechen 
society. This is why zikrists tended to support the Bolshevik banners during 
the 1918-20 civil war in Russia, often fighting against the armies of General 
Denikin. The Soviet power initially flirted with the Chechen Muslims to 
gain support, but soon placed believers under repression. Arrests of zikrist 
became commonplace, however, as sources point out, the zikr never ceased, 
not even in prisons or exile.  
After the mass deportation of 1944, the Kunta-Hadji brotherhood 
gained even more strength. Its growing popularity could be explained by the 
great misfortune of the Chechen people: people often found hope and peace 
in their systematic prayers to God and the invocation of their spiritual father, 
the "Son of Kisha."  
Upon the restoration of the Chechen-Ingushet Republic in 1957 and 
until the beginning of Perestroika in 1985, the relations between authorities 
and Kunta-Hadjists have been largely antagonistic, sometimes shifting to 
alert-neutrality. The process of revival of Islamic values has led to the 
intensification of Kunta-Hadjist communities, the establishment of a 
religious hierarchy and growth of the number of those studying Islamic 
theology.  
In the fall of 1991, a group led by General J. Dudaev acceded to 
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power in Chechnya. It is said to have represented the radical extreme of the 
nationalist circles15. Declaring himself as a murid of Kunta-Hadji, Dudaev 
ensured his new regime a certain level of political support from the more 
backward and darker side of this movement. The symbols of the "new 
revolution" were zikrist mass prayers on the central streets and squares of 
Grozny. However, praying on the dirty city asphalt for true murids was a 
disgrace, and so it is clear that these popular "dances" were engineered by a 
hired "ensemble" of individuals with no dignity and respect for the true 
traditions. The Kunta-Hadjist communities soon overcame the euphoria of 
"victory", and their attitude towards Dudaev and the like became more 
careful. In the years of the first Chechen war (1994-96), young murids 
actively protested against the violence of the federal Russian troops, and 
displayed fanatical resistance.  
In the aftermath of the war, the entire Chechen society was struck 
by a new danger—Vakhabism. On the edge of this new fight were 
particularly the Kunta-Hadjists, whose values were declared heretical by the 
Vakhabits in the first place. In a series of bloody clashes occurred in villages 
between young murids and Vakhabits. The zikrists declared that the 
Vakhabits should be kicked out of Chechnya, and were strongly supported 
by all other Sufi orders in Chechnya. This line was persistently carried out 
by the Mufti (leading cleric) of Chechnya, Ahmed-Hadji Kadyrov, 
belonging to the Order of the "Son of Kisha."  
In July 1998 in the city of Gudermes massive fights arose between 
the Vakhabits and their opponents, which led to the killing of over 100 
Vakhabits. Having lost this major battle, the Vakhabits concentrated their 
forces in the town of Urus-Martan, transforming it into their fortress.  
The Kunta-Hadjists, on the other hand, openly supporting the 
restoration of the Shari'a Islamic laws, have severely criticized president 
A.Maskhadov for his ambiguous stand towards the issue of Vakhabism. For 
that matter, in the current war many ordinary Kunta-Hadjists have adopted a 
neutral position, or even a clear anti-Maskhadov stance, such as A.H. 
Khadyrov. Their hope is that the Russians will one day leave, but the 
Vakhabits want to strengthen their positions in Chechnya forever.  
The Kunta-Hadjist Order in Chechnya to this day has no united 
leadership, since there are no direct descendants of the Sheik. It is only 
known that in Turkey resides a descendant of the Sheik's daughter, General 
D.Gyunesh, former head of the joint-staff of the Turkish armies, and in 
Russia dwells a descendant of the Sheik's sister—General-major I. 
Suleymenov. There are rumors that descendants of Sheik's brother, Movsar, 
live in Iraq. The emergence of a unifying leader could make the Order the 
strongest ruling power in Chechnya. The emergence of a strong leading 
15 There are different opinions 
among the Chechens about 
the role of Dudaev in the 
events of 1991-1995. Some 
still consider him a national 
hero. 
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personality in the Order could potentially lift that individual to one of the 
most significant levels of power in the country. 
Paradoxically, to become leader of the Kunta-Hadjist Order in 
Chechnya, and subsequently in a position to seize political power there, 
would be possible only for someone like General D. Gyupesh, because he is 
the only direct descendant of the Kunta-Hadji16. 
 
16 None of the 
descendants of Kunta-
Hadji can become the 
leader of the movement 
since none of them has 
maintained a religious 
life and their style of 
living is far from the 
principles advocated by 
Kunta. 
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Avduev’s Critique of Akhmadov’s Paper 
 
One objective of our study of religious brotherhoods in Chechnya is to 
promote the type of public discussions that will promote a greater 
understanding of the diversity of thought in this area. A first step in this 
effort was a response to Professor Akhmadov’s  paper by an exiled Chechen 
intellectual, Albert Avduev, who is familiar with the Vakhab movement.  
The critique of the Akhmadov paper rests on several key points. A 
contradiction of the historical record presented by Akhmadov is Avduev’s 
first point. Kunta Hadji, Avduev argues, was not an ethnic Chechen. His 
paternal ancestors came from one of the Turkish tribes in Daghestan and his 
sole Chechen link was through his mother. Avduev maintains that 
Akhmadov has presented a false historical record by relying upon 
documents that had been falsified by the Russians and further distorted by 
the ideological climate of the 19th century.  
Furthermore, placing the Kunta Hadji order within the context of 
Russian and, later, Soviet policy toward Islam, Avduev insists that, 
following the 1864 arrest of Kunta, Russia worked to undermine traditional 
Islamic beliefs and institutions in the Caucasus. The Russian objective was 
to create an “official” Islam that would be sympathetic to Russian 
administration of the region. By using falsified religious texts and recruiting 
locals to work with Russian administrators as exponents of the new, 
“official” Islam, Russian authorities believed they could effectively disarm 
Islam as a weapon of resistance to their control.  
Avduev maintains that, in contemporary Chechnya, the teachings of 
many religious activists are completely distorted and, as a result, numerous 
sects encourage animism, fanaticism, and other distortions of “true Islam”. 
Such groups, he argues, are not real orders because they lack structure and 
statutory organizations and they are too small (usually no more than 2000 
members) to have any real impact on current developments. Moreover, such 
groups have distorted religious rituals and have transformed the zikr into an 
inappropriate display of screaming and dancing. The Chechen national 
liberation movement does not rely upon these groups because they are seen 
as having suspect connections with Russian police agencies.  
Avduev explains that President Maskhadov, by contrast, has 
embraced groups and individuals with connections to the Russian security 
services. Referring to the Kadyrov case of 1997, Avduev argues that 
President Maskhadov issued a pardon and appointed Kadyrov as mufti of 
Chechnya. The evidence in the case was subsequently destroyed. An 
additional indication of what Avduev sees as the suspect character of the 
Former Chechen 
President Jhokhar 
Dudaev performing 
a religious ritual 
President Aslan 
Maskhadov 
General Shamil 
Basaev 
 24
Kunta Hadji order is Akhmadov’s contention that former colonel of the 
Soviet Army Suleimenov, who was appointed general by Dudaev, was a 
descendent of Kunta. Such an individual, with his conviction on charges of 
corruption and theft prior to escaping to Moscow, could hardly claim 
kinship with Kunta.  
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Relevance of Religious Brotherhoods to 
Current Conflict 
 
 
In order to appreciate the relevance of the Kunta Hadji movement, it is 
necessary to place this brotherhood within the context of other such 
associations in Chechnya.  As noted above, the Kunta Hadji is only one of 
an estimated twenty-seven Chechen brotherhoods but, with the Vakhab 
movement (also known as the Djamaat movement), it is one of the two 
largest. A result of this multiplicity of religious groupings is that each has 
developed an exclusive sense of community or clannishness that encourages 
members to promote only their immediate “brothers”. Non-members are 
regarded as being beyond the moral code that applies only within each 
particular community. Consequently, corruption is not only rampant but is 
also justified on the basis of religious affiliation and dogma.  
One important consequence of this corruption has been an 
exacerbation of tensions leading to violent clashes involving groups 
identified with religious brotherhoods. An example of one such clash 
occurred in 1998 in Gudermes, an industrial center which had fallen under 
the control of organized crime after the first Chechen war. In this case an 
armed Vahkab group known as Shariat’s Guard waged a battle against a 
criminal gang that was attempting to assert control over local industrial 
enterprises. The criminal gang was under the leadership of Sulim 
Yamadaev, one of Chechnya’s most prominent underworld figures, and 
enjoyed the patronage of Ahmed Kadirov, an important local politician. An 
estimated twenty-eight people were killed during the battle and an additional 
dozen died in subsequent skirmishes.  
Thus, both corruption and violence have become the hallmark of 
contemporary Chechen life. The deterioration of national life is reflected in 
changes in the patterns of societal violence since the immediate post-Soviet 
period. During the first Chechen war, there was a degree of national unity 
that was reflected in the fact that almost all factions joined in fighting 
against the Russians. For them, the fighting was seen as a war of national 
liberation. The more recent post-Soviet years have been characterized by the 
vendettas undertaken by individuals whose families were killed in early 
clashes that now appear to have been futile efforts to assert national identity.  
In this environment, it is not surprising that almost all sects have 
armed formations,  generally described as militias, which work to advance 
the often-divergent interests of their particular brotherhoods. A very 
Chechen soldiers in prayer 
 
Photo courtesy of the Chechen 
Republic Site, www.amina.com   
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practical explanation for the appearance of such formations is that the North 
Caucasus region is populated by numerous veterans who served not only in 
the Soviet Army but fought in the conflicts in Abkhazia and Afghanistan. 
These people have limited training beyond their military education and have 
almost no civilian career options in the region's terrible economic 
environment. Shamil Basaev, for example, participated in the fighting in 
Abkhazia and Maskhadov served with Soviet troops that suppressed 
demonstrations in the Baltic states. For such people, armed conflict provides 
a natural opportunity for one of the services they can best provide. 
The basis for most active of the armed groups in Chechnya is the 
former members of the Shariat’s Guards, the Shariat’s "Courts", and former 
members of various organs of state security. The Shariat’s Guards and the 
Shariat’s Courts were organized by Chechnya’s Vakhab movement and 
were composed of young men who saw themselves as being at the forefront 
of the fight against criminality and corruption. The stated goal of the 
Shariat’s Guard was to implement decisions made by the Shariat’s "Courts." 
Those quasi-judicial decisions were intended to serve as expressions of the 
Sharia, which is a specific interpretation of the Koran. The Sharia, therefore, 
should be viewed as law based on the Koran. Each sect, of course, has its 
own interpretation of the Koran in order to advance that sect’s specific 
agenda. The overall goal of the Shariat’s Guard was to reinstate the “true 
law”, which for the Vakhab movement means full equality for all men 
before God and the law. In short, this was intended to be a practical code of 
behavior for all followers of Islam.   
Since 1997, most of the militias’ military efforts have been directed 
against other sects rather than against state agencies. This situation is, in 
large part, a result of the Shariat’s Guard view of itself as the true expression 
of legitimate state power and the resultant necessity to direct their efforts 
against other sects that challenged their legitimacy. In this, they present 
themselves as being involved in the struggle against corruption and 
criminality rather than as agents of religious extremism.  
The religious brotherhoods have emerged as major political actors 
in Chechnya and they played an important role in facilitating the demise of 
the Dudaev regime. While Dudaev utilized religious appeals in advancing 
his political agenda, it became obvious to serious Muslims that Dudaev's 
commitment to the Kunta Hadji movement was, at best, superficial and, 
more likely, insincere. This apparent hypocrisy, coupled with complaints 
over his increasingly dictatorial operational style and suspicions that he was 
a "Russian agent," contributed to his political decline.  
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Contrast between Kunta Hadji and Vakhab 
Movements  
 
While the clashes between the various armed formations might be dismissed 
as the expressions of narrow self-interest, it is essential to note that there are 
important differences between the Kunta Hadji and Vakhab movements as 
well as other sects operating in Chechnya.  
Much of the contrast between the two main groups is based on 
theology and philosophy. There are several important religious differences 
that set the Kunta Hadji movement apart from the Vakhab movement. The 
latter believes in general equality before the law and argues that all men 
should be treated equally regardless of nationality, wealth or language. Like 
most Muslims, this egalitarianism does not extend to gender issues. Women 
have a subordinate place in Chechen society, whether they live in the 
Vakhab or the Kunta Hadji communities. The Vakhab brotherhood is far 
less clannish than the Kunta Hadji and, for that matter, other sects. The 
Kunta Hadji, of course, unlike the egalitarian Vakhab, claim numerous 
saints.  
Again consistent with Vakhab egalitarianism, leadership positions 
or functions are not inherited. They are, by contrast with the Kunta Hadji, 
based on personal merit. This is closer to traditional Chechen mentality. 
Their struggle against corruption is justified on the basis of their view that 
there should be no favoritism or special arrangements for anyone. In the 
Kunta Hadji community, leadership is inherited and closely parallels their 
belief in sainthood.  
In addition to these religious disputes, there are important 
distinctions in terms of their respective views of Russians. The position of 
the Kunta Hadji, while not identical to that of the "official" Islamic 
institutions of the Soviet era, is much more supportive of Russia. Its 
essentially pacifist posture creates an environment in which it is possible to 
advocate a continued place for Chechnya within the Russian Federation. By 
contrast, the Vakhab movement advocates the restoration of "true Islam" 
and supports a struggle against domination by the Russians. They are also 
openly hostile to the region's traditional Sufi Islam because of its moderation 
and its incorporation of pre-Muslim traditions. For the many Russians as 
well as Sufi Muslims who feel threatened by this tendency, Vakhab is 
simply another word for "extremist." The Kunta Hadji followers joined the 
Russians in denouncing the Vakhab movement as a great threat to 
Chechnya. Interestingly, while there is considerable focus on the anti-
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Russian orientation of the Vakhab, it is important to remember that the 
brotherhood maintains an equally critical view of Western society.  
It is also essential to note that there is a fundamental trend that 
works against stability in the North Caucasus region. It is something that can 
be seen not only in Chechnya but also in Dagestan and central Asia. The 
main features of this trend are: (1) a collapse of state authority, (2) a lack of 
faith in state officials, (3) economic adversity, and (4) persistent intervention 
by Islamic groups from abroad. The violence that came in 1999 to Dagestan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikstan was driven by these factors and the 
Chechen situation is subject to the same factors.  
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Connections with Taliban and Other 
Outside Groups 
 
Recognition of the fact that such an important and dynamic brotherhood 
can, like other Islamic movements for national liberation, pose a challenge 
to Western society prompts legitimate questions about their relationship 
with Islamic organizations outside the region. While Islam did much to 
provide spiritual comfort to Chechen soldiers during the 1994-96 war, it has 
undergone dramatic changes during the decade since the collapse of the 
USSR. Most important, open borders have made it possible for Arab 
missionaries espousing a more radical form of Islam to find converts in the 
Caucasus  region as well as what was Soviet central Asia. The newly 
converted Muslims have been increasingly hostile to Chechnya's traditional 
Sufi orders and have opened the door to outside groups with more violent 
tendencies.  
One such organization that has attracted attention because of these 
developments is the Taliban movement. While there are important 
philosophical differences between Chechen religious brotherhoods and the 
Taliban there are also some similarities. The essential fact, however, is that 
within Chechnya there is little interest in the Taliban or, for that matter, 
other such groups located abroad. The primary reason for this disinterest is 
the fundamental provincialism of most Chechen movements. They see 
events and actors within Chechnya and the Chechen community as of 
primary importance and all others of limited relevance to their struggles.  
Apparently, the Russians take the Taliban much more seriously. 
Reportedly, Russian President Vladimir Putin feels Osama bin Laden and 
the Taliban have supported Chechen efforts to gain their independence from 
the Russian Republic and has even threatened to bomb Afghanistan if 
necessary.  
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Reprise 
 
 
For over six millennia the Chechens have defended their way of life in their 
Northern Caucasus homeland. As the chart of Russian-Chechen relations 
above illustrates, the history of these two valiant peoples can be 
characterized as a never-ending cycle of warfare, conquest followed by an 
independence movement, conquest, independence movements, and internal 
dissent. Every generation of young Chechen manhood has had the 
opportunity for martyrdom to the national cause. Following each 
suppression of Chechen separatism, revenge accompanied by suppression 
and wholesale slaughter has threatened to obliterate the Chechen culture and 
way of life. All parties in this ongoing conflict have given the others ample 
cause for hatred and vengeance. The tragedy of Chechnya is that this cycle 
of violence seems destined to continue. Its continuation is made likely if not 
probable by a variety of factors. The fact that it suffers from a weak state 
structure under the control of a leadership lacking either legitimacy or the 
ability to forge a consensus is one of those factors.  The absence of a 
popular consensus about the identity of the Chechen nation is highlighted by 
the fact that while many Chechens are willing to die for freedom from 
Russia, others seem perfectly content to live in Russian communities and 
under Russian control elsewhere in the former USSR. Equally significant is 
a regional economic collapse that has denied people an economic avenue for 
advancement outside the criminal underworld. Coupled with the infusion of 
a more militant form of Islam from neighboring states, these factors 
guarantee that, for Chechnya, crisis is a way of life.  
 
Chechen soldiers resting 
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Photo courtesy of the Chechen 
Republic Site, www.amin a.com  
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